Analysis of Accounting Information distortion and Dynamic Game Model of Listed Companies in China

Qin Xu, Zimin Bai

Abstract


Based on the point of view of corporate governance, this paper analyzes the causes of accounting information distortion of listed companies from two aspects of economic interests and administrative interests, probes into the conditions of accounting information distortion of listed companies, and focuses on the problems of insider control, immature manager market, one dominant stock and the false establishment of independent directors. By constructing the dynamic game model of listed company, accounting firm and CSRC, this paper analyzes the important factors that affect the probability of collusion between listed company and accounting firm and the probability of providing distorted accounting information by listed company under Nash equilibrium state, and finally puts forward some corresponding suggestions for the distortion behavior of accounting information of listed company.


Full Text:

PDF


DOI: https://doi.org/10.20849/abr.v7i2.1056

Refbacks

  • There are currently no refbacks.


Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Asian Business Research  ISSN 2424-8479 (Print)  ISSN 2424-8983 (Online)

Copyright © July Press

To make sure that you can receive messages from us, please add 'julypress.com' domain to your e-mail 'safe list'. If you do not receive e-mail in your 'inbox', check your 'bulk mail' or 'junk mail' folders.