Reflections on Chinese Zombie Enterprises From the Perspective of Nash Equilibrium Theory
Abstract
This paper gives the game analysis on zombie enterprises, banks and governments using Nash equilibrium theory in order to explore how to break the predicament of Chinese zombie enterprises. The optimal scheme is that the government does not provide subsidies for zombie enterprises, banks do not offer loans for zombie enterprises, and zombie enterprises apply for bankruptcy liquidation. Then According to the conclusions, put forward relevant policy suggestions to the government, banks and zombie enterprises.
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PDFDOI: https://doi.org/10.20849/abr.v4i1.539
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